Modeling of Zakat in the capital structure theory by Sanusi, N.A. et al.
          Journal of Fundamental and Applied Sciences 
 
 
MODELING OF ZAKAT IN THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORY
 
N. A. Sanusi1,*, A. G.
1School of Social Development and Economics,Universiti Malaysia Terengganu
Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu




Islamic financial instruments are subject to taxes and zakat 
holders. Therefore, it is important to investigate the implementation of corporate taxes and 
corporate zakat in capital structure compositions. In order to model corporate zakat in terms 
of conventional capital structure th
those theories in depth. The introduction of zakat are based on the conventional static 
trade-off theory developed by previous research
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The most important business decisions that a financial manager has to make are the capital 
structure and the tax deductions. There is ample empirical evidence on the way financial 
managers make capital structure 
received much attention. Most of the empirical literatures[6, 8
benefits of tax. 
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Even though payment of tax is a common practice for many firms, the tax puzzle remains a 
controversial issue in the corporate finance literature. This is mentioned by [5-6, 11, 33-35]as: 
“tax deduction encourages firm to utilize debt and hence encourage bankruptcy”. An 
alternative for tax payments is to pay zakat (or wealth tax). Until now, most of the literature 
has viewed the tax benefits and the zakat payments in isolation. However, the tax deductions 
and the zakat payment are both expected to influence capital structure decisions.  
There is a large body of theoretical literature on capital structure. From this literature, it can 
be concluded that corporate tax is an important factor in making capital structure decisions. A 
firm that utilizeshigher debt financing is likely to pay less tax. The most important 
distinguishing factor between the forms of payment consists of zakat. The fact that 
traditionally equity financings are treated less favorably than debt financings has given rise to 
the earlier mentioned tax puzzle. This puzzle was created by the fact that firms pay less tax on 
the one hand and are exposed to risk of bankruptcy in the form of higher interest payments on 
the other. The next question on whether zakat leads to an a priori advantage or disadvantage 
for the utilization of debt financings by firm is unclear. Managerial option plans are expected 
to reduce debt financings because they increase current liabilities and therefore the amount of 
zakat. 
In this research, we try to develop model of Islamic capital structure theory by taking the 
zakat payment into account. Conventional capital structure theory just focuses on the static 
trade-off theory, agency conflicts theory and pecking order theory. More specifically, this 
study will focus on the introduction of zakat in the conventional static trade-off theory 
developed by [7, 23]. Malaysia is of particular interest, since it is the only country in the 
world where zakat payments are deducted from income tax. Another interesting aspect of the 
Malaysian market is that a large number of firms do pay zakat. The combination of these two 
facts leads to an interesting sample that includes firms that only pay tax and firms that pay 
both tax and zakat. 
1.1. The Traditional Capital Structure Theory 
The discussion of capital structure started with [24], who argued that capital structure 
decisions cannot affect firm value. In a perfect market, leverage choices have no impact on 
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value and managers who imperfectly operate markets are acquainted with how an imperfect 
market could manage to decide among choices of capital structures. 
Furthermore, in [24] begin by making several assumptions about capital structure and firms. 
These assumptions simplify their analysis and focus it entirely on the valuation effects of 
debt. However, they argued that capital structure composition was considered irrelevant to a 
firm’s market valuation.  
1.2. Proposition I without Taxes 
The M&M Proposition I without taxes stated that for perfect markets, the total market value is 
the same as the value of its assets, which is referred to as the company’s capital structure 
independence. The value of assets is the same as the present value of cash flow resulting from 
the assets. Since the proposition suggests that the capital structure of a firm is not an issue. 
This condition is recognized as the “irrelevance proposition”. 
In addition, as the first assumption explained previously, when it has no taxes and good 
capital market function, it creates no contrast whether the firm takes on debt or not. Thus, the 
market value of a company is independent of its capital structure, i.e. VL = VU. 
V = V = = =  (1) 
whereVL: levered firm value, VU: unlevered firm value, EBIT: earnings before interest and 
taxes (net operating profit), rA: the weighted-average cost of capital (WACC) and rEU: the 
equity cost on unlevered firm. 
Equation (1) represent that the market value of any firm does not depend on a firm’s capital 
structure. Instead, it is defined by emphasizing the expected net operating income at the rate r. 
Moreover, utilizing an arbitrage argument, M&M proved Proposition I. The “no-arbitrage 
principle” where M&M’s argument rests, states that market prices must be adaptable in 
equilibrium, even at the point where there are no arbitrage opportunities at all. M&M also 
argue that if the value of a levered firm is different from that of its identical, unlevered 
counterpart, arbitrage can be carried out. Since arbitrage opportunities cannot last long, the 
two firms have to have the same value in the equilibrium. 
 
 
N. A. Sanusi et al.            J Fundam Appl Sci. 2017, 9(6S), 900-916            903 
 
1.3. Proposition II without Taxes 
The second significant insight is that despite debt raises smaller number of costs in issuing 
that kind of equity. Referring to Equation (1), the relationship between the returns of levered 
equity (rEL), debt (rD) and unlevered equity (rEU) can be written as: 
r + r = r  (2) 
Solving for rEL the next equation for the return of levered equity can be retrieved: 
r = r + (r − r ) (3) 
Equation (3) shows how changes in debt and equity result in change in a firm’s value. 
Specifically, the second term of the equation signifies the extra risk added because of 
leverage. Therefore, the extra risk a firm stimulates ultimately depends on the quantities of 
leverage a firm holds, i.e. the debt-equity ratio (D/E). In addition, Equation (3) also points out 
that when the debt ratio increases, equity cost will increase because shareholders take on 
higher risk and thus ask for a higher rate of return. Furthermore, the WACC will remain 
constant, and so will the value of firm. In other words, the capital structure is independent of 
the value of firm. Finally, Equation (2) brings up the second proposition of [25] for whom 
“the cost of capital of levered equity is equal to the cost of capital of unlevered equity plus a 
premium that is proportional to the market value debt-equity ratio”. 
1.4. Proposition I with Taxes 
As previously discussed, in [25] already have established the irrelevance of a firm choosing a 
capital structure in perfect capital markets. The following section will introduce an important 
source of friction, taxes, into the M&M framework. Interestingly, five years after their 
original work in 1958, they came out with a new study in 1963. The former was corrected by 
the latter, in which tax consideration was omitted from their theory. As a result, firms are able 
to increase their value by using debt to decrease taxes. If a firm tries to utilize debt, the need 
to pay interest on that debt decreases corporate taxes. Consequently, the taxes are an incentive 
for a firm to use leverage. The firm’s value is considered based on its leverage or capital 
structure.  
If the author lets VU and VL be the value of the firm without and with leverage respectively, 
the changes can be shown in the following Equation (1) which requires taxes to be created: 







+ T D (5) 
V = V + T D (6) 
Equation (6) shows a levered firm’s total value over that of the unlevered one because the tax 
savings present value in the form of debt financing (tax advantage of debt). Furthermore, 
based on the assumption that the corporate tax rate is greater than zero and interest payments 
can by deducted from taxable income, Equation (6) also suggests that only with 100% debt 
can an optimal capital structure be achieved. Thus, the equation represents that if TC is 
constant, the firm’s value grows linearly with D because of tax benefits.  
1.5. Proposition II with Taxes 
Furthermore, the following proposition shows that equity cost is dependent on its leverage. 
r = r + (r − r )(1 − T ) (7) 
Equation (7) is almost identical to Equation (3) (Proposition II without taxes) and the 
difference is (1-TC). Furthermore, since (1- TC) < 1, the effect of tax will raise the equity cost 
but it will then decrease slowly, so that the weighted-average cost of capital (WACC) 
decreases and at one level it will increase.  
1.6. The M&M Model with Corporate and Personal Taxes 
There are some academics such as [23] who have discussed the relationship between taxes 
and debt, stating that tax advantage earned by a corporation in terms of debt is waived by the 
leverage personal tax disadvantage. In [23] considers personal taxes so that he can show that 
the “100% debt” implication is irrelevant. 
Furthermore, Equation (6) leads to the tax profit of leverage where a corporation must pay 
taxes. Individual interest payments earned from debt are taxes as income. This is what should 
concern the corporation. Under this condition, dividends and capital gains had to be paid by 
investors. Because of that, just as with corporate taxes, personal taxes deplete the cash flows 
to investors. This results in investors reducing the value of a firm. Thus, the actual interest tax 
shield is in accordance with the total tax reductions between personal and corporate taxes 
paid. Furthermore, in [23] also explained that tax advantage of debt over equity at the 
N. A. Sanusi et al.            J Fundam Appl Sci. 2017, 9(6S), 900-916            905 
 
corporate level could be offset by the non-benefit tax at the individual level either fully or 
partially.  
Synthesizing differences in corporate income tax rates as well as personal tax rates on interest, 
dividends and capital gains, in [23] produced the following formula to estimate the gains by 
including leverage. 








whereTC: tax rate within corporate profits, TPS: personal tax rate on income on stock (equity 
income), TPD: personal tax rate on income on debt (interest income) and D: market value of 
the corporate outstanding debt. 
Equation (9) helps resolve the seeming conflict between leverage and taxes. Consequently, 
while debt is profit at the corporate level since it decreases a firm’s tax burden, the impact of 
debt income for personal taxes could increase, decrease or even reverse the beneficial effects 
over debt financing as all of them are based on the equity income personal tax rate on debt. 
For instance, the tax can even be even negative if the interest income TPD is larger than the 
corporate tax rate TC and equity income TPS. 
1.7. The M&M Model and Non-Debt Tax Shield 
Coming after [23], several researchers also established tax-based extension of the basic capital 
structure models. It is also worth noting that [8] included non-debt tax shields (NDTS) as a 
substitute for debt in corporate financial structures. Their NDTS premise states that firms that 
experience enormous depreciation, investment tax credits and research and development 
expenditures as well as other forms of NDTS had better utilize a smaller amount of debt 
financing than an equivalent firm with fewer shields.  
This hypothesis on secured debt has been theoretically and empirically supported. More 
recent work on the subject has already covered how to measure NDTS’s separate effect and 
also the assets that can be collateralized, support both NDTS and the secured-debt hypotheses 
[10, 14, 22, 32]. 
1.8. The M&M Model and Financial Distress 
As discussed before, previous studies have indicated that firms fail to completely exploit the 
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debt tax advantage. There are some suggestions; one of them is opting for low leverage levels at 
which the financial debt is accompanied by specific costs that preclude firms from exploitation, 
especially in term of interest tax shields. It means that the optimal leverage cannot be 
determined only by taxes.  
Furthermore, the discussion will then proceed to deal with financial distress, i.e. the largest cost 
of financial debt. In conclusion, the level of debt financing is proportional to the probability of 
default. Putting taxes aside, another crucial distinction between financing debt and equity lies in 
the debt payment. The debt payment has circumvent potential bankruptcy, otherwise dividend 
payments or capital gains can be restrained by firms. Especially, if there is distressis probability 
where for firm, it is supposed to be costly, those cost could counterbalance the tax advantage of 
debt financing. Consequently, the M&M model must consider the financial distress costs as 
market imperfections and include them when looking at the capital structure decisions of firms. 
Later, in [23] realized that there is impact of bankruptcy cost on capital structure decisions.In 
the next paper, this author supposes that the influence made on costs is more marginal than a 
very large benefit resulting from tax shields of leveraged firms. 
Fear resulting from bankruptcy is caused by so many financial debt. It leads to why tax benefit 
of debt are seldom exploited. A large number of reported works have come out with research on 
the impact of bankruptcy risk on a firm’s capital structure decision. Those reports basically 
have different variable choices used to determine whether there is potential for bankruptcy.  
However, in [16] reasoned that bankruptcy “…occurs when the fixed obligations to creditors 
cannot be met. It this case, there is a transfer of ownership and a formal reorganization of the 
capital structure of the firm. The costs associated with this transfer can be categorized as either 
direct or indirect. Direct costs include legal, accounting and trustee fees as well as the possible 
denial of income tax loss carryovers and carrybacks. Indirect costs relate to opportunity costs 
resulting from disruptions in firm-supplier or firm-customer relationships that are associated 
with the transfer of ownership or control”. 
1.9. The Presence of Zakat in Malaysian Business 
As discussed previously, the most crucial reason for firms to increase the amount of debt is 
the tax shield resulting from the tax savings gained from paying interest on the debt. Hence, 
using debt, a firm’s estimated tax liability could be reduced. Consequently, increasing the cash 
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flow after taxes leads to more profits and the ability of a business to assume a higher debt 
level. Eventually, the higher debt level can be employed in order to raise a debt tax shield for 
those firms. Nevertheless, there is an alternative for tax payments namely zakat payments 
[37].  
Until now, the discourse on zakat payment and zakat in general have been progressively 
extending throught business environment. However,in [37]have considered zakat payments as 
an influence on capital structure decisions. However, tax deductions and corporate zakat 
payments are both expected to influence the capital structure decisions. Furthermore, 
Malaysia is one of the few countries in the world where corporate zakat payments are 
deducted from the income tax [2, 4, 36]. Moreover, in [2] asserted that more Malaysian firms 
are becoming more interested in fulfilling their zakat obligations.  
According to [2], the administration of zakat is handled by the states through their respective 
State Islamic Religious Councils (SIRCs). Zakat itself is regulated under the authority of the 
respective state or the prerogative rights of the Sultan. Last but not least, those rules are valid 
except for the Federal Territory where the Federal government supervises the administration 
and law of zakat. In accordance, every state arranges its own zakat matters including the 
collection method, disbursement policy, administrative aspects, execution and degree of 
enforcement. 
However, there is a main zakat principle for corporate wealth that is in accordance of 
merchandise goods (‘urud al-tijarah), equal to anything obtained with the aim of achieving 
benefits for a corporation. The wealth which has fulfilled the requirement and reach nizab 
must become zakatable. In this case, nizab is equal to monetary value of 85 grams of gold. 
Once both nizab and the calculation value are completed, zakat must be paid every year at the 
rate of 2.5%.  
Furthermore, a standard accounting has a very close relationship to zakat payments in terms 
of simplifying zakat formulation. Internationally, the Accounting and Auditing Organization 
of Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) has published a Financial Accounting Standard for 
zakat (FAS 9) already in effect since 1 January 1999. The document outlines quite 
comprehensive standards for zakat accounting as an Islamic financial institution. 
Nonetheless, in [2] contends that the AAOIFI FAS 9 is rather limited in the Malaysian context. 
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As mentioned before, the AAOIFI-issued standard can be applied only to IFIs or Islamic 
Financial Institutions. Based on this condition, it has a limited range in companies and 
partnerships. Consequently, AAOIFI FAS 9 may not be immediately applied to other entities. 
Howevers, there are two types of zakat measurement that are recommended by FAS 9s. They 
are the the net assets (net current assets) and the net invested funds (net owner equity) 
methods. Both suggested methods produce the desired outcome. The first method considers 
all cash, assets acquired for trading, receivables net of doubtful debts and net financing assets 
(excluding unearned income) to be assets. Fixed assets and long-term investments are 
excluded. Thus, the zakatable amount is all assets minus the fixed assets, intangibles, current 
liabilities and long-term investments. Under the second method, the invested funds include 
paid-up capital, reserves, general provisions (investment risks), maintained earnings, net 
income and long-term liabilities. Thus, the zakatable amount is the whole amount minus the 
net fixed assets, investment not earned from trading and any other losses. 
Meanwhile, at the Malaysian level, zakat is refeenced in the 1967 Income Tax Act, especially 
in section 44 (11A). In 2005, related to the amount of zakat should be paid by a company, the 
government had already permitted it to be calculated at 2,5 % of overall income [2]. 
Later, the Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB) released TR i-1 (Technical Release 
i-1 on “Accounting for Zakat on Business”), an accounting pronouncement for corporate 
zakat effective since 1 July 2006. The accounting pronouncement focuses on facilitating the 
zakat calculation for businesses that can be utilized by companies from various industries. 
Though TR i-1 stressed zakat calculation because most of business-related zakat issues fall 
under the SIRC’s jurisdiction (and thus are considered beyond the purview of MASB), TR i-1 
only handles financial reporting issues regarding the zakat of a corporation [2]. Other 
deductions on the zakat of corporation made by an entity (including issues such as zakat 
chargeability, calculation, determination of the zakat base and eligibility of assets and 
liabilities) should be subject to the conclusions achieved in cooperation with the respective 
zakat center. Therefore, it is crucial to note that TR i-1 only provides guidance on commonly 
held principles of accounting to solve a specific accounting issue, thus lacking legal 
enforcement [1].  
However, The MASB Technical Release i–1 suggested two methods of zakat accounting 
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calculation. namely Adjusted Working Capital Method (syari’ah) and Adjusted Growth 
Method (urfi’ah). Nowadays, the zakat payment practised by accountants in Malaysia is based 
on adjusted working capital [1]. Importantly, those two methods would eventually give the 
same calculation of zakat base.  
Furthermore, a serious problem related to zakat data is that there is no common standards for 
calculating zakat payments by corporations in Malaysia. In spite of the MASB TR i-1, firms 
will exhibit stress in their financial statements. There is no punishment if firms do not comply 
with that guidance. 
Based on empirical research by [1], among 33 listed Government Link Companies (GLCs) in 
Malaysia, the guidelines of TR i-1 were not being followed. For instance, in one of the GLCs 
in Malaysia, their zakat calculation is not made according to the net current assets as 
suggested by the guidelines but rather based on profit after tax. Accordingly, it can be 
concluded that GLC practice was entirely different and did not follow TR i-1. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1.Modeling of Corporate Zakat  
As discussed previously, capital structure of a firm is an important aspect that must be decided 
by the managers as it will ultimately relate to the firm’s value. How a manager determines the 
composition of capital structure is an important task. However, further discussion will focused 
on development of a theoretical model that considers the objectives of the study as described 
earlier, especially in terms of the influence of zakat on capital structure decisions.  
Furthermore, the theoretical model to develop the relationship between zakat and firm’s 
capital structure is adopted from [7]. Several modifications will be introduced. The 
modifications involved the construction of a static capital structure model in the presence of 
zakat. In addition, the modifications also incorporated the modes of Islamic debt and equity 
financings. The model captures the essence of the tax advantage and bankruptcy cost trade-off 
models of [19, 21, 32]; the agency cost of debt arguments of [17-18, 28-29]; the potential loss 
of non-debt tax shields in non-default states in [8]; the differential personal tax rates between 
income from stocks and bonds in [23] and the extensions of Miller's model by [7-8, 20, 
24-25]. 
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However, the model involves zakat payment as an Islamic instrument due to the modeling of 
the Islamic capital structure. In a nutshell, the model will treat zakat as non-tax shield that has 
expected effects on finance decisions. 
Regarding the purpose of developing an Islamic capital structure, this study employs the 
original model from [7], then extends that model to considering zakat payments. More 
importantly, to develop a model that represents the current state in the theory of optimal 
capital structure, the following assumptions have to be fulfilled: 
1. Investors are risk-neutral. 
2. Investors face a progressive tax rate on returns from bonds(tpb), while the firm faces a 
constant corporate tax rate(tc) and also faces a constant zakat rate(zc). 
3. Corporate and personal taxes are based on end-of-period wealth. Consequently, debt 
payments (interest and principal) are fully deductible in calculating the firm’s 
end-of-period tax bill, and are fully taxable at the level of the individual bondholder. 
4. Equity returns (dividends and capital gains) are taxed at a constant rate, tps. 
5. There exist a non-debt tax shield such as accelerated depreciation and investment tax 
credits, that reduce the firm’s end-of-period tax liability. 
6. Negative tax bills (unused tax credits) are not transferrable (saleable) either through time 
or across firms. 
7. The firm will incur various costs associated with financial distress should it fail to meet, in 
full, the end-of-period payment promised to its bondholders. 
8. The firm’s end-of-period value before taxes and debt payments(X) is a random variable. If 
the firm fails to meet the debt obligation to its bondholders(Ŷ) the costs associated with 
financial distress will reduce the value of the firm by a constant fraction k. 
Furthermore, under the above assumptions of the model, the uncertain end-of-period pre-tax 
returns to the firm’s stockholders and bondholders can be written as follows:  







𝑋  ̶  Ŷ (1  ̶  𝑡 ) +  𝜙 – 𝑧 𝑋 ,
𝑋 –  Ŷ – 𝑧 𝑋 ,
0,
  
X≥  Ŷ + ϕ /t  
Ŷ ≤ X< Ŷ + ϕ /t  
X< Ŷ 
(10) 









X(1   ̶ k)– z X ,
0,
  
X≥  Ŷ 
0 ≤ X< Ŷ 
X< 0 
whereY , Y = the gross end-of-period returns to bondholders and stockholders respectively, 
X= The firm’s end-of-period value before taxes and debt payments, Ŷ= the total end-of-period 
promised payment to bondholders, ϕ= the total after-tax value of the non-debt shields if they 
are fully utilized at the end-of-period, t  = corporate tax rate, z = corporate zakat rate and k 
= costs of financial distress of end-of-period value of the firm. 
The model modification above incorporates zakat payment as a non-tax shield. Zakat 
payments are calculated based on firm’s earnings before taxes and debt payments. More 
spesifically, Equation (10) shows that if pre-tax earnings are large enough for the firm to fully 
utilize the non-debt tax shield (ϕ /t ), then the gross end-of-period return to stockholders is 
X   ̶ Ŷ − ϕ/t (1  ̶  t ) +  ϕ/t  – z X  = X   ̶ Ŷ (1   ̶ t ) +  ϕ – z X . Then, if the firm’s 
pre-tax earnings are such that X   ̶ Ŷ − ϕ/t < 0, the firm will pay no tax but will still pay 
zakat and Assumption 6 implies that the end-of-period return to stockholders is 
X –  Ŷ – z X . Meanwhile, the end-of-period pre-tax return to bondholders in Equation (11) 
follows from Assumption 8 and bondholders have limited liability in the event that the firm’s 
end-of-period value X is negative. 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
According to Assumption 1 that of risk neutrality, Equations (10) and (11) provide the 
following beginning-of-period market value of the firm’s stocks (S) and bonds (B): 




X − Ŷ (1 − t ) + ϕ − z X f X dX +  X − Ŷ − z X f X dX
Ŷ /
ŶŶ /














d X +  X(1 − k) − z X f X d(X)
Ŷ
                                                                     (13) 
where S, B = the market value of the firm’s stocks and bonds respectively, E(r ), E(r ) = one 
plus the expected pre-tax rate of return from stocks and bonds respectively, r = one plus the 
rate of return on default-free, tax-exempt bonds, f(X) = probability density of X, tps = equity 
returns (dividends and capital gains) are taxed at a constant rate and tpb = progressive tax rate 
on returns from bonds. 
Furthermore, adding Equation (12) and (13) yields the market value of the firm (V): 
V =  
1
r
(1 − t ) X(1 − k) − z X f X d X  
Ŷ
+ X − Ŷ − z X 1 − t +  Ŷ 1 − t f X d X
Ŷ /
Ŷ
+ X − Ŷ (1 − t ) + ϕ − z X 1 − t +  Ŷ(1
Ŷ /
− t ) f X d X                                                                                                       (14) 
Equation (14) shows that the value of the firm is equal to the present value of the sum of three 
expected values (integrals). The first integral represents the situation in which is X positive 
but insufficient to meet its debt obligation. Under this condition, the payment to the firm’s 
bondholders is X minus total costs of financial distress, kX and then minus total zakat 
payments of the firm’s end-of-period value before taxes and debt payments z X. Consistent 
with the assumption of a wealth tax, the payment to the firm’s bondholders and net of costs of 
financial distress is subject to the personal tax rate (tpb). 
These integrals represent a state in which the firm’s end-of-period pre-tax value(X) is greater 
than its debt obligation (Ŷ), but less than the maximum level of earnings that would result in a 
zero end-of-period corporate tax bill (Ŷ + ϕ/t ). In these conditions, the firm has no 
corporate tax bill. However, the payments to bondholders and stockholders are subject to 
personal tax rates. Finally, the third integral defines the after-tax cash flow to the firm’s 
security holders if earnings are sufficient to pay bondholders and to generate a positive 
corporate tax liability.  
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Furthermore, the firm’s optimal leverage decision involves setting Ŷ, the end-of-period 
payment promised to bondholders such that the market value of the firm is maximized. 
Differentiating (5) with respect to Ŷ yields the first-order condition of Equation (15) where 
VŶ is the partial derivative ∂V ∂Ŷ⁄ . 
VŶ =  
(1 − t )
r
−k − z +
(1 − t )z
(1 − t )
 Ŷ. f Ŷ
+ 1 − F Ŷ 1 −
(1 − t )(1 − t )




t F Ŷ +
ϕ
t
− F Ŷ                                                                (15) 
where F is the cumulative of probability density function of X. 
The first term in Equation (15) represents the marginal net tax advantage of debt, while the 
second and third terms represent marginal expected leverage-related costs. The optimal 
leverage involves balancing the net tax advantege of debt against leverage-related costs, 
non-debt tax shields and zakat. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
Based on the deveoped model, we can utilize the comparative statics analysis. The 
comparative statics of the leverage relevancy model can be shown by differentiating the 
optimally condition (15) with respect to each of the relevant exogenous variables. 
Differentiating VŶ  in (15) with respect to z , k, ϕ, t and t  yields the following 
cross-partial derivatives: 
VŶ =
( ) Ŷ. Ŷ
< 0   (16) 
VŶ =
 Ŷ. Ŷ
< 0 (17) 
VŶ =
 (Ŷ ) 
< 0 (18) 
VŶ =
Ŷ   Ŷ
>
(  ) Ŷ
>
Ŷ. Ŷ
> 0 (19) 
VŶ =  
(  )Ŷ. Ŷ Ŷ
< 0 (20) 
The cross-partial derivatives in Equations (16)-(20) are negative. However, there will be a rise 
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in term of zakat payment, financial distress cost and also non-debt tax shield (NDTS). All of 
those three items can lead to a decreasing of the optimal debt level.  
Further, the comparative statics provide the following testable implications: 
1. The optimal level of debt has inversely a very clese relation toward corporate zakat 
payment. 
2. The optimal level of debt has conversaly a very close relation over financial distress costs, 
where cost of bankrupty and the agency of costs of debt involved.  
3. The optimal level of debt has conversly a close connection toward the level of NDTS, 
which stands for Non-Debt Tax Shields. 
4. The optimal level of debt has a highly relation over the equity of personal tax rate. 
5. The optimal level of debt is inversely connected to the tax rate of marginal bondholder. 
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